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Abstract
In this paper …nancial contagion and crises are endogenized through the in-
teractions among corporations, banks and the interbank market. We show that
the lack of …nancial disciplines in a single-bank-…nancing economy generates in-
formational problems and thus the malfunction of the interbank market, which
constitutes a mechanism of …nancial contagion and may lead to a …nancial crisis.
In contrast, …nancial disciplines in an economy with diversi…ed …nancial institu-
tions lead to timely information disclosure from …rms to banks and improve the
informational environment of the interbank market. With symmetric informa-
tion in the interbank market, bank runs are contained to insolvent banks and
…nancial crises are prevented. Our theory sheds light to the causes and timing
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of the East Asian crisis, it also has important policy implications on lender of
last resort and banking reform.
1. INTRODUCTION
It has been documented that …nancial crises often accompany problems in …nancial
institutions, probably even more so at some speci…c stages of development. The recent
…nancial crisis in East Asia, and the major …nancial crises in Europe and America in
the late 1920s and in earlier times, are some examples. This paper develops a theory
which endogenizes …nancial crises through institutions related to the corporate sector,
banks and the interbank market. The basic idea is that di¤erent ways of …nancing
corporate investment projects may a¤ect the nature of bankruptcy in failing projects.
This in turn a¤ects information in the interbank market. For …nancial institutions
unable to commit to liquidate bad projects, there will be informational problems
between entrepreneurs and banks, which will cause informational problems among
banks in the interbank market. Severe information problems in the interbank market
can lead to a market failure, which constitutes a mechanism for …nancial contagion
and creates conditions for a …nancial crisis.
Our theory emphasizes the role of …nancial institutions in explaining …nancial
crises, in particular the recent East Asian …nancial crisis. Right before the crisis,
the East Asian economies had been doing so well that there was a major debate
among economists concerning the nature of the “miracle.” The breaking out of …-
nancial crisis in East Asia presents great challenges to economists and policy makers.
A particularly puzzling phenomenon regarding the crisis comes from the comparison
between Korea and Taiwan. Korea and Taiwan were both regarded as the major
phenomenon of the so-called “East Asia Miracle.” However, while Korea was at the
center of the East Asian crisis, Taiwan was much less a¤ected — even though it too
had been attacked by international speculators.
Is this di¤erence an accident? Our analysis on the functions of corporate and
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banking institutions will provide an answer to this puzzling phenomenon. Consistent
with observations that the …nancial crisis in East Asia were deeply linked to their
corporate …nancial problems, our theory suggests that di¤erent …nancing structures in
East Asian economies generate profound impacts to the information in their …nancial
markets, which further a¤ects …nancial stability.
Our theory can be summarized as follows. We endogenize information structures
in two di¤erent kind of economies. In an economy where corporations are …nanced
by multiple banks or through a syndicated loan, liquidation of bad projects/…rms
becomes a norm in the economy. Liquidation of bad projects makes information
public so that the banks have better knowledge about each others’ assets and solvency.
In the rest of the paper, we term this kind of economy a multi-bank-…nance (MBF)
economy.
In an economy where …nancing decisions to corporations are concentrated (e.g.
the Japanese main bank system or the Korean principal transaction bank system),
however, liquidation of bad projects/…rms becomes an exception. Without liquidation
of bad projects, banks with bad projects can easily hide bad news from others. We
show that in such an economy bad projects are not liquidated and thus the solvency
of a …nancier is not known to other …nanciers. In the rest of the paper, we call this
kind of economy as single-bank-…nance economy (SBF).
In our model, an economy has many banks which receive deposits (à la Diamond
and Dybvig, 1983) and invest in long-term projects with stochastic returns. Moreover,
there is an interbank market which may solve liquidity shortage problems among
banks. That is, when a bank faces a liquidity shock it may borrow from others in
the market. The function of the interbank market depends on the information of
borrowing banks’ asset quality. When an equilibrium is such that bad projects are
liquidated, which can be observed by other banks, the interbank can function well
and through trading among banks it can solve the liquidity problem faced by illiquid
banks.
However, if lending banks in the interbank market are unable to distinguish solvent
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and insolvent borrowing banks, i.e. there is a pooling equilibrium, all illiquid banks
are treated in the same manner. In that case, asymmetric information between
…nanciers will make the interbank lending market a “lemon” market. In this lemon
market, all borrowing banks face the same nominal expected cost. This implies
that solvent banks will have to subsidize the borrowing of insolvent banks. With
private information about one’s own solvency, a better-quality borrowing bank will
face higher costs of borrowing due to this implicit subsidy.
When a liquidity shock is severe enough, such high borrowing costs can lead a
solvent bank to choose between liquidating assets and facing a bank run. We assume
that a liquidation implies a poor management while a well managed bank can still
experience a bank run due to exogenous liquidity shocks; and bank managers have
career concern. Thus, from a bank manager’s perspective, a liquidation is worse than
a bank run. As a result, illiquid banks with better-quality assets may not borrow
and face a bank run earlier than other banks. Moreover, a bank run on better banks
will deteriorate the quality of the lending market which may trigger more bank runs
by the same logic. We then further demonstrate bank run contagious risks can lead
to the collapse of the lending market and thus a …nancial crisis, in particular when
the investment projects are heterogeneous in quality.
We also show that a pooling equilibrium in the interbank market does not always
lead to a …nancial crisis when there are only idiosyncratic shocks and the projects are
heterogeneous in quality. This is because the expected borrowing cost for good banks
monotonically decreases with the average quality of the projects in the economy and
the homogeneity of the projects’ quality. If the average quality of the projects is high,
and/or the projects are very homogeneous in quality, the interbank market works well
and there is no bank run or …nancial crisis. But when the projects are heterogeneous,
as long as the average quality of the projects is not very high, a pooling equilibrium
in the interbank market becomes an incubator for …nancial crises.
This result has implications for the timing of a …nancial crisis in a pooling equi-
librium economy. An economy should have no trouble when most of its sectors are
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similar, e.g., most projects are at similar imitation stages; but the situation will
change when the projects are more heterogeneous, such as when the imitation stage
of the economy has ended.
One of our major contributions to the literature is to model the function and failure
of the interbank market with the presence of both liquidity and technological shocks
and imperfect information.1 We show that a certain type of …nancial institutions
(MBF) makes information in the market symmetric; in that case bank runs are
contained. A contagious bank run in our model is a result of an interbank market
failure due to informational problems, which are caused by the SBF institution. We
endogenize the Akerlof’s (1970) lemon problem and extend it from real markets to
the liquidity market between lenders and borrowers. In a separate paper (Huang and
Xu, 2001), we further extend our analysis of banks’ liquidity management in a model
with interbank market and liquidation of real assets.
von Hayek (1945) outlined a principle according to which it is the market, rather
than the government, that provides the right information for the economy to operate
e¢ciently. However, what this means in the context of a …nancial crisis is unclear.
One of our major contributions is to provide a model to illustrate that a commitment
mechanism to liquidate bad projects can make solvency information available to the
market on a timely basis.
With respect to the recent literature on …nancial crisis, Aghion, Bolton, and De-
watripont (1999) and Allen and Gale (2000) are related to our work, but their em-
phases are quite di¤erent from ours. Aghion, Bolton, and Dewatripont (1999) focus
on systemic shocks to the entire banking system. In comparison, …nancial crises in
our model can be caused by idiosyncratic as well as systemic shocks. We study a
mechanism of negative externalities in the interbank market that transforms idiosyn-
cratic shocks into a systemic liquidity shock, and thus bank failure contagion. Allen
and Gale (2000) derive …nancial contagion from the incompleteness of the structure
1See Bhattacharya and Gale (1987) and Rochet and Tirole (1996) for contributions on modeling
the interbank market with liquidity trading.
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of interregional claims. If we reinterpret our interbank market as a form of inter-
connectedness among all the banks in their model, then we show that even with a
complete structure of interregional claims, informational problems in the market can
still lead to …nancial contagion.
Moreover, in our model, the pooling and separating equilibria in the interbank
market are endogenized through two types of …nancial institutions. A …nancial system
where key decisions on project re…nancing are made by “multi creditors” is more likely
to liquidate bad projects ex-post. The reason is that the costs of renegotiation are
higher when there are multi-creditor decisions; hence liquidations are more likely to
occur; that is, multi-bank …nancing can be used as a commitment device to create a
separating equilibrium. In contrast, …nancial systems where key decisions are made
by single creditors do not face such high renegotiation costs and thus are more likely
to reorganize rather than to liquidate; that is, the system is not able to commit to
stopping bad projects, thus good and bad projects are pooled together. Examples of
such single-creditor systems include the main-bank system in Japan and the principal-
transaction-bank system in Korea.
To focus on our major points, we analyze two types of a “pure” economy: a
SBF economy whereby only a pure pooling equilibrium exists, and a MBF econ-
omy whereby only a pure separating equilibrium exists. We also suppose that the
choice of the …nancial system in an economy depends on some exogenous reasons that
make multi-…nancier …nancing too costly, such as high costs to enforce contracts. The
idea about using multi-…nanciers as a commitment device is inspired by Dewatripont
and Maskin (1995), Hart and Moore (1995), and Bolton and Scharfstein (1996).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 brie‡y overviews the
…nancial institutions in Korea and Taiwan. Section 3 establishes the basic structure
of the model. Section 4 endogenizes information distributions between banks and
corporations and in interbank market. Section 5, in particular subsections 5.3 and
5.4, investigates how bank run contagion are created in a SBF economy and when
it can lead to a …nancial crisis. Finally, section 6 concludes with some quali…cations
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and elaborations of our theory in relation to the existing literature, and discussions
of policy implications.
2. FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS AND CORPORATE FINANCING IN
KOREA AND TAIWAN
Korea and Taiwan are at similar development stages, geographically close, and they
also have similar technologies, labor inputs, and high savings. In both economies
the share of trade in GNP is much higher than the world average; and each economy
has been transformed from traditional one into a high tech oriented one. Moreover,
both were regarded as the major phenomenon of the so-called “East Asia Miracle.”
However, while Korea was at the center of the East Asian crisis, Taiwan was much
less a¤ected — even though it too has been attacked by international speculators. Is
this di¤erence an accident?
In this section we present brief overviews of the Korean and Taiwanese economies
to illustrate that their …nancial institutions are quite di¤erent, and how this di¤erence
may related to their di¤erent performances in the East Asia Financial Crisis.
It is well documented that Korean development has been characterized by the es-
tablishment of large conglomerates (chaebols) through government-coordinated bank
loans. In a typical case, …nancing decisions for projects in Korea are made by the
government or by the principal bank among a group of investing banks. For example,
in the 1970s the Korean government promoted investment in the heavy and chemi-
cal industries by selecting projects and providing subsidized loans. In the 1980s the
government promoted specialization in the largest chaebols through a similar …nanc-
ing approach. In the two decades since the early 1970s, more than half of Korean
domestic credits were distributed as government policy loans with low rates (Stern
et al., 1995; Cho and Kim, 1995).2 It is well documented that the decision making
2A closely related fact is that Korean …rms were over-leveraged as their average debt-equity ratio
was among the highest in the world since the 1970s (Borensztein and Lee, 1998; Lee, 1998). Before
the outbreak of the 1997 crisis the average debt-equity ratio of thirty top chaebols was about 4.5.
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of policy loans were concentrated in the hands of the government.
The subsidized government loans led to distortions in corporate capital structure:
between 1965 and 1970, the debt-equity ratio of manufacturing …rms in Korea in-
creased from 0.94 to 3.29 (Nam and Kim). To reform the ine¢cient loan allocation
scheme, the Korean government established a credit control system called a “prin-
cipal transactions banking system” in the mid-1970s. Under this system, the bank
which was most involved …nancially with each chaebol was designated as the prin-
cipal transactions bank to coordinate all lending activities. Any new credit to be
issued by a bank to the chaebol was supposed to be evaluated by the principal bank.
However, this principal transactions banking system was not substantially di¤erent
from the government-coordinated …nancing scheme. That is, …nancing decisions were
concentrated to either the government or the principle bank.
Although there were complaints that with a predominance of government coor-
dinated bank …nancing, credits were not allocated e¢ciently to Korean …rms3, the
great success in the period of 1960s to the mid 1990s seems evident. Problems in
corporate …nancing structure only become well noticed to outsiders when the East
Asia Financial Crisis hit Korea. Some Korean economists claimed that excessive
credit expansions caused 5 of the top 30 and 7 of the top 50 chaebols insolvent; it
was documented that the insolvent chaebols had debt-equity ratios from 5.14 to 36
while the average of the 30 top chaebols was about 4.49 in April 1997 (Pak, 1997,
p.1). A natural question to address is why creditors would be willing to continue
providing credit to insolvent or nearly insolvent chaebols? A closely related fact to
the high debt …nancing is that there was almost no bankruptcy in Korea before 1997
Moreover, a recent econometric work shows that a signi…cant part of the total credit in Korea was
not used productively (Demetriades and Fattouh, 1998).
3Using panel data of thirty-two Korean manufacturing sectors in the period from 1969 to 1996,
Borensztein and Lee (1998) show that credit was allocated preferentially to the sectors with larger
…rms, with exports, and with worse economic performance. Examining …rm level data for the 1984 -
86 period, Dailami and Kim (1994) discover that subsidized credit encouraged chaebols to hold more
…nancial assets and real estate investments, but not actual productive assets.
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(particularly for chaebols).
Major Insolvent Chaebols
Hanbo Usong Sammi Jinro Taenong Kia
Asset Ranking 14 27 26 19 33 8
Debt/Equity 6.75 17.1 32.3 36.0 18.2 5.14
Source: Kyong-so Pak (1997), p.1.4
Systematic evidence indeed suggests that closing down Korea plants were not re-
lated to …nancial disciplines. From panel data of more than 40,000 Korean manufac-
turing plants for the 1983 - 1993 period, Aw, Chung, and Roberts (1998) discover
that the productivity of plants being closed down was about the same as those in
operation. This suggests that decisions involving closure of plants were not related
to e¢ciency considerations.
Comparing with Korea, Taiwan …rms relied on much more diversi…ed …nancial
sources. Creditors in Taiwan were not coordinated by the government or other
agents (Japanese type of main bank system does not exist in Taiwan). Even state-
owned banks were supposed to make …nancing decisions by their own. Moreover,
equity …nancing played a much larger role in Taiwan – the average debt-equity ratio
of all Taiwan …rms during the 1985 - 1992 period was about 1.4 and the ratio of the
large …rms was even lower (about 1.2) (Semkow, 1994, p.84).
Moreover, …rms in Taiwan were subject to e¤ective …nancial discipline and thus
there had been frequent bankruptcies in the corporate sector in the past several
4Closely related to the ine¢ciencies of the projects being invested, the losses from projects …nanced
by bank loans caused serious problems for Korean banks. At the end of 1986, nonperforming loans
at the …ve largest commercial banks amounted to three times the total net worth of those banks
(Park and Kim, 1994). To relieve the troubled banks, between 1985 and 1987 the Bank of Korea
provided them with more than 3 trillion won in subsidized loans (Nam, 1994).
Implicitly complaining about the chronic problem of lack of …nancial discipline in Korean chaebols,
some Korean economists claim that the excessive leveraged expansion ultimately resulted in the
insolvency of …ve of the top thirty chaebols (Park, 1997), thus triggering the …nancial crisis.
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decades. Ine¢cient …rms were indeed disciplined: the productivity of closed-down
(disciplined) …rms was 11.4 percent to 15.5 percent lower than that of other …rms
(Aw et al., 1998).
In the rest of the paper, we are going to explain how corporate …nancing determines
…nancial disciplines of the …rms, and how this is related to …nancial stability.
3. THE MODEL
We consider a one-good economy, which has many entrepreneurs, M banks and
bank managers, and N £ M depositors. Entrepreneurs have ideas about new in-
vestment projects but no wealth to …nance them. In this model any uncertain
investment can be a project, such as an investment in technological innovation or
imitation. Among all the projects proposed by entrepreneurs, ¸ percentage of the
projects are of good type, and the rest are of bad type. Ex ante, neither entrepre-
neurs nor banks know which project is good and which project is bad, but they both
are fully aware of the probability distribution.
A project takes three periods to …nish, requiring a total investment of I1+ I2+ I3,
where It is the required investment in period t, and It À 1: The technology of the
project has a constant return to scale. A good project generates an ex-ante pro…table
return, Y > I1 + I2+ I3; while a bad project generates no return as it stands.
For a project being …nanced, we assume that at date 1 an entrepreneur will learn
its type, while the bank(s) still will not know the type. However, at date 2, the
bank(s) will know the type of the project. If a project is of a bad type, it can be
reorganized at date 2 and the best return a reorganized bad project can generate
is X , and I3 < X < I2 + I3, that is, it is ex-ante unpro…table but can be ex-post
pro…table. Therefore, at date 2 a decision has to be made by the bank(s) regarding
a bad project: either to reorganize it or to liquidate it.5
5The setup of the model shares some features with Qian and Xu (1998). But that paper is
based on the Dewatripont-Maskin contractual foundation, while this paper establishes a di¤erent
contractual foundation for the commitment problem.
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Concerning reorganization, we assume that there are two strategies a and b to
reorganize a bad project during the third period, but only one of them can generate
a pro…t ex post. The decision on a speci…c strategy the bank(s) selects depends on
their information. We suppose that in the case of co-…nancing, banks A and B will
observe di¤erent information, represented by signals sA and sB respectively, where
sJ 2 [s; s], s < s and J = A, B, after I3 is invested.
We suppose that an entrepreneur gets a private bene…t bt from working on a project,
where t denotes the date when the project is either completed or terminated at
t = 1; 2; 3.6 Speci…cally, if the entrepreneur quits the project at date 1, he gets a
low private bene…t, b1 > 0. At date 2, if a bad project is liquidated, the entrepreneur
gets an even lower private bene…t b2b, where 0 · b2b < b1. At date 3, if a bad
project is reorganized and completed, it will generate a private bene…t b3b > b1 to
the entrepreneur; in the case of a good project, it will generate a private bene…t,
b3g > b3b, to the entrepreneur. To summarize, we have b3g > b3b > b1 > b2b ¸ 0.
In this economy, banks exist because they create liquidity and monitor investments
on behalves of small depositors (Diamond, 1984; Gorton and Pennacchi, 1990). Bank
managers are hired to manage banks, to make investment decisions, and to monitor
bank investments in …rms. They are risk-neutral, and do not want to be identi…ed as
bad managers (e.g., career concerns).
All the M banks in the economy are ex-ante identical, and each N depositor de-
posits $1 in a bank. Thus, each bank’s asset is $N . The M banks form an interbank
market to trade liquidity. We assume that the liquidation of a bad project is observ-
able by all the banks; while without liquidation the nature of a project …nanced by
a bank is not observable by another bank that is not involved in the investment and
monitoring of the project.
In our economy there are two types of risk-averse depositors, as described by Di-
amond and Dybvig (1983): early consumers only consuming at t = 1, and late
consumers only consuming at t = 3. Ex ante, all depositors are identical and do not
6We use the term private-bene…t in such a general way that it includes both rewards and penalties.
11
become aware of their types until t = 1. Moreover, each depositor’s $1 endowment
can be stored from one period to the next, without any cost, or it can be deposited
in a bank which then invests in a project with stochastic technology, yielding a pos-
itive expected return in the future.7 They make their investment decision based on
an ex-ante belief about the riskiness of the banking system and about the market
equilibrium return on deposit. They supposedly do not have the required expertise
to be entrepreneurs or bank managers, nor do they monitor banks because of high
surveillance costs.
Each depositor’s preference is de…ned as
U = ¼1u(C1) + ½¼2u(C2);
where Cj is the consumption of type j depositor; j = 1 being early consumers who
consume at t = 1 and j = 2 being late consumers who consume at t = 3; ¼j is the
probability of a depositor being a type 1 or type 2 consumers, and ¼1+¼2 = 1; ½ < 1
is the discount factor and ½ (R + 1) > 1; where R is the return from investment, which
is to be determined in later sections; and u
0
> 0, u
00
< 0, and (Cu
0
)
0
= u
0
+ Cu
00
< 0.
Now we summarize the timing of the game as follows:
² Date 0: All parties know the probability distributions of projects and depositors,
but no one knows the type of each project and the type of each depositor. The
bank(s) o¤er a take-it-or-leave-it contract to the entrepreneur. If the contract is
signed, the bank(s) will invest I1 units of money into the project during period
1. Each depositor makes savings decision with a bank.
² Date 1: The entrepreneur learns the type of the project, and may stop the
project in case of realizing a bad project. In that case the entrepreneur gets a
private bene…t b1 > 0 and all the banks observe the liquidation of the project.
However, unless a project is stopped by the entrepreneur the bank(s) still does
7Note that unlike the Diamond and Dybvig model, which has a positive and deterministic return,
in our model the return is stochastic, with an expected positive value.
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(do) not know the type of the project and further I2 units of money are invested
into the project. Moreover, the bank(s) will know the probability distribution of
their own projects better than other banks. Early consumers withdraw money
from the banks, late consumers make their decisions wether to withdraw or to
keep deposits in the banks. A bank facing too many early withdrawals has to
borrow, otherwise it has to abort the project, resulting in no return.
² Date 2: The type of a project becomes public knowledge:
– If a project is of a good type, a further I3 will be invested.
– If it is a bad project, a decision whether to liquidate or to reorganize has
to be made.
¤ If a project is liquidated the bank(s) gets zero and the entrepreneur
gets b2b < b1; otherwise,
¤ if a project is reorganized, I3 will be invested.
² After investing I3, signals sA and sB are observed by the investor(s) and a
reorganization strategy is chosen based on the signals.
² Date 3: All projects are completed,
– for a good project, return Y goes to the bank(s), entrepreneur gets b3b > b1;
– for a bad project, return X goes to the bank(s), entrepreneur gets b3g > b3b;
– late consumers collect their rewards.
4. FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS AND INFORMATION
DISTRIBUTIONS
In this section we explain how …nancial institutions can cause informational prob-
lems in an interbank market. For more detailed technical results and their proofs,
please see Huang and Xu (1999).
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We assume that an entrepreneur always prefers to have his project completed
regardless of its type; but when completion is not possible, he prefers to quit the
project as soon as possible. To express this assumption in a formal way, we assume
that an entrepreneur gets a private bene…t bt from working on a project, where t
denotes the date when the project is either completed or terminated at t = 1; 2; 3.
Speci…cally, if an entrepreneur quits the project at date 1, he gets a low private
bene…t, b1 > 0: If a bad project is liquidated at date 2, an entrepreneur gets an even
lower private bene…t b2b, where 0 · b2b < b1. At date 3, if a bad project is reorganized
and completed, it will generate a private bene…t b3b > b1 to an entrepreneur; in the
case of a good project, it will generate a private bene…t, b3g > b3b, to an entrepreneur.
To summarize, we have b3g > b3b > b1 > b2b ¸ 0.
With respect to …nancing, a project can be …nanced by one bank alone, or can be
co-…nanced by two (or more banks) jointly.
The timing of the game related to project …nancing is as follows:
² Date 0: All parties know the distribution of the projects and the depositors,
but no one knows the type of each project and the type of each depositor. The
bank(s) o¤er a take-it-or-leave-it contract to an entrepreneur. If the contract is
signed, the bank(s) will invest I1 units of money into the project during period
1.
² Date 1: The entrepreneur learns the type of the project. If the entrepreneur
stops the project (liquidation), he gets a private bene…t b1 > 0 and all the banks
observe the liquidation of the project. However, unless a project is stopped by
the entrepreneur the bank(s) still does (do) not know the type of the project and
further I2 units of money are invested. Moreover, the bank(s) will know the
distribution of their own project better than before as its private information,
i.e., ¸m, is more accurate than the prior ¸.
² Date 2: The type of a project becomes public knowledge:
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– If a project is of a good type, a further I3 will be invested.
– If a project is of a bad type, a decision whether to liquidate or to reorganize
has to be made.
¤ If a project is liquidated the bank(s) get(s) zero and the entrepreneur
gets b2b; otherwise,
¤ if a project is reorganized, I3 will be invested.
² Date 3: All projects are completed,
– for a good project, return Y goes to the bank(s), the entrepreneur gets
b3g;
– for a bad project, return X goes to the bank(s), the entrepreneur gets b3b.
If a project is a good one, it generates a high return Y no matter how it is …nanced.
For a bad project, we suppose that there are several strategies to reorganize it during
the third period, but only one of these strategies can generate X, which is ex post
pro…table. However this strategy can only be selected and implemented when all the
involved bank(s) is (are) in agreement.
Under single-bank …nancing, given that the earlier investments are sunk, the bank
will choose an ex-post e¢cient strategy to reorganize the project such that the payo¤
is greater than the ex-post cost of re…nancing, I3. As a result, the bank is unable to
commit to terminating a bad project ex post.
Moreover, the fact that the bank is not able to commit to terminating a bad
project a¤ects the entrepreneur’s ex-ante incentives to reveal information. When the
entrepreneur at date 1 discovers that his project is a bad one, he anticipates that the
project will still be continued and re…nanced by the bank at date 2 as long as it lasts
until then. Consequently, if he decides to quit the project, he gets private bene…t b1;
if he decides to continue the project, the bad project will always be re…nanced by the
bank and will generate a private bene…t b3b > b1 to the entrepreneur. Therefore, the
entrepreneur will always choose to continue a bad project after he privately discovers
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its type. This implies that in an economy where every project is …nanced by one
bank, the information to separate the good projects from the bad ones is available
neither to the …nancier nor to the interbank market at date 1.
However, in the case of multi-bank …nancing, the asymmetric information and con-
‡icts of interest among the co-…nanciers related to reorganizing the project incur a
cost, F for ex-post negotiations. When this cost, F , is high, the gain from reorgani-
zation is less than the total costs, i.e., X < I3 + F . Therefore reorganization is not
worthwhile and liquidation will follow.8
The commitment to liquidate a bad project at date 2 has a deterrent e¤ect on
entrepreneurs who have bad projects. Fearing further losses of his private bene…t
later, an entrepreneur will choose to quit a bad project as soon as he discovers it is
bad. Assuming the observability of liquidation, this result implies that if all projects
in an economy are …nanced by two banks, at date 1 information is available in the
interbank market to separate the good projects from the bad projects.
The following lemma summarizes the above results.
Lemma 1 At date 1, single-bank …nancing leads to a pooling equilibrium in the in-
terbank market such that good projects cannot be distinguished from bad projects;
multi-bank …nancing leads to a separating equilibrium in the interbank market such
that good projects can be distinguished from bad projects.
To simplify our language in the above lemma, in the reminder of the paper we call
an economy under multi-bank …nancing an economy with hard-budget constraints
(HBC); and an economy under single-bank …nancing an economy with soft-budget
constraints (SBC), a term coined by Kornai (1980).
8This is a reduced form of Huang and Xu (1999). It can also be derived from a variation of some
other models, such as Dewatripont and Maskin (1995), Hart and Moore (1995), and Bolton and
Scharfstein (1996).
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5 FINANCIAL CONTAGION AND FINANCIAL CRISES
To make our basic point in the simplest possible way, we abstract government away
from our model in the section. We will incorporate the role of government into our
model later.
5.1 Deposit Contract
Similar to Diamond and Dybvig, in our model a market equilibrium in which all
agents trade can Pareto dominate that of autarchy; but the market equilibrium does
not necessarily provide a perfect insurance against liquidity shocks. The main reason
in our model is that there may be information asymmetry in the interbank market
which can give rise to contagious risks.
At date 0, consumers make a deposit decision by solving {[
max
K
U = ¼1u(C1) + ½¼2u(C2)
s.t. 1 = ¼1C1 + ¼2C2= (1 + R)
]}An ex-ante optimal market equilibrium can only be achieved by increasing C1 and
decreasing C2, that is
C¤1 > 1;
C¤2 < 1 + R:
A bank can implement the market solution through a deposit contract a la Diamond
and Dybvig. That is for $1 deposit at t = 0, a depositor receives either C¤1 at t = 1,
or C¤2 at the end of the exercise. For each dollar it receives as deposit, the bank holds
¼1C
¤
1 (as cash) at no extra cost, and invests the rest in illiquid technology which
yields a higher return. As banks are competitive in the economy, at C¤1 and C¤2 banks
on average earn zero pro…t. That is {[
¼1C
¤
1 + (1 ¡ ¼1)C¤2= (1 + R) = 1:
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]}This ex-ante optimal deposit contract is a pure strategy Nash equilibrium. That
is, an early consumer always wants to consume at t = 1, but a late consumer has
no incentive to withdraw early. This is because as long as ½(1 + R) > 1, u
0
(C¤1 ) =
½(1 + R)u
0
(C¤2 ) holds if C¤1 < C¤2 , and any deviation does not pay, as long as other
late consumers do not deviate.
However, there may be a bank run equilibrium, that is, a simultaneous deviation of
all late consumers. In this case, the bank has to liquidate its project (which has zero
value for simplicity) if borrowing from the interbank market is not possible or too
expensive.9 As a result, the bank will fail and nothing will be left for late consumers
when they withdraw later than others. Anticipating this, all late consumers will
withdraw at t = 1, and a bank run becomes self ful…lling. A key for the existence
of a bank run equilibrium is the possibility that a bank cannot solve its liquidity
shortage problem by borrowing from the interbank market. This turns out to be a
key condition to extend Diamond and Dybvig’s framework from a one-bank economy
to a multi-bank economy.
In our multi-bank economy the total number of depositors is …nite, with N de-
positors in each bank and the realized numbers of type 1 and 2 depositors for each
bank are random draws from binomial distributions of ¼1 and ¼2 = 1 ¡ ¼1 respec-
tively. In the next two subsections, we will analyze …nancial contagion in MBF and
SBF economies. We start from the problem faced by the bank manager in a MBF
economy.
5.2 Bank Run in a MBF Economy
Following our results for a MBF economy, at equilibrium all bad projects are
stopped at date 1 and all good projects are completed. Therefore, every bank knows
that all continued projects are good ones. The ex-ante expected deposit return in
9 In a separate paper (Huang and Xu, 2001) we allow banks to liquidate illiquid assets to solve
their liquidity shortage problems. See Diamond and Rajan (1998) for an analysis of liquidating
illiquid assets.
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such an economy is:
RM =
¸Y ¡ [I1 + ¸(I2 + I3)]
I1 + ¸(I2 + I3)
> 0:
To meet an expected number of early withdrawals a bank’s optimal investment de-
cision is to store cash in the amount of N¼1C¤1 , and to invest all the rest — in the
amount of N(1¡ ¼1C¤1 ) — into a project. Every bank co-invests with another bank
in one project, given the symmetry of the banks, and the investment is made in the
following way,
N(1 ¡ ¼1C¤1 ) =
1
2
[I1 + ¸(I2 + I3)] :
In the event that a project is a bad one and aborted at date 1, the realized value
from the investment is zero. In this case, if there are more than ¼1N +
¸(I2+I3)
C¤1
depositors trying to withdraw at date 1, the bank will run out of cash because of
the excessive demand for withdrawals. Because it is known that this bank has a bad
project and will not be able to pay back its loan, it will not be able to borrow in the
interbank market. Thus a bank run can occur with a positive probability in a MBF
economy, when there are both technological shocks and liquidity shocks.10
Now let us look at the case where a bank manager is informed at date 1 that the
project is a good one, which will generate a good positive return at date 3. In this
case, when there is an unexpected excess early withdrawals, the bank can borrow
from other banks.
As other banks in the interbank market also know that this bank has invested in
a good project, they know this bank will de…nitely generate a return at
RMg =
Y ¡ (I1 + I2 + I3)
I1 + I2 + I3
> RM :
In this case, when the bank with a good project faces excess early withdrawals, it
10 If late consumers can observe the liquidation of bad projects, a bank run will occur for sure after
the bank’s project is liquidated.
For the sake of simplicity, we do not allow the bank with a bad project to start another project at
date 1. Moreover, this setup avoids giving an MBF economy too great an advantage over an SBF
economy, which would also divert our focus in the analysis.
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can borrow from other banks.11 Therefore, a bank with good project can solve
its liquidity shortage problem by borrowing from other banks so that a bank run is
avoided.
Proposition 1 In a MBF economy, because of symmetric information among banks,
a bank run occurs when a bank faces both technological and liquidity shock; but bank-
run contagion is not possible.
The last point of the above proposition is more interesting. A MBF economy does
not experience a contagious bank run simply because with symmetric information
among banks, the interbank lending market is able to provide liquidity to all illiquid
but solvent banks, these that are not hit by technological shocks. As a result, although
there are still possible isolated bank runs in a MBF economy, bank-run contagion does
not occur.
5.3 Bank Run in a SBF Economy
Following our earlier results, in a SBF economy without a commitment to liquidate
bad projects at date 2, entrepreneurs with bad projects will cheat at date 1. Thus,
at date 1 banks in a SBF economy do not know the exact type of a project that they
are …nancing. However, we assume that every bank has a better understanding of
11The bank can issue a risk-free bond to borrow from other banks. The bond has a face value
of $1 and is sold at price p per share. p is determined by the competitive bank lending market. In
equilibrium RHg ¸ 1=p and there is su¢cient demand for such a bond.
From the supply side, since each bank stores N¼1C¤1 amount of cash, there is enough supply of
liquidity to meet the total amount of withdrawals of MN¼1C¤1 as long as there is no bank run.
Moreover, as some banks will have excess liquidity generated from the termination of bad projects,
liquidity supply in the interbank market is plenty. Indeed, banks can improve their ex ante liquidity
management because of the excess liquidity available due to termination of bad projects (Huang and
Xu (2001) provides further analysis on liquidity management of banks and liquidity equilibrium in
an interbank market).
Furthermore, because C¤1 < C
¤
2 , it is not worthwhile for any late consumers to withdraw deposits
earlier (at date 1).
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the risk of its own project. That is, at date 1, the manager of bank m (m = 1; :::;M );
through her project-monitoring for one period of time, has better information than
at date 0, such that she knows that the probability of her project being a good one is
¸m. But this is her private information. Suppose that the qualities of all banks can
be ranked as ¸1 < ¸2 < ¸3 < ::: < ¸M , which is not known by any bank manager,
but the average quality of banks, ¸ = 1M
PM
m=1¸m, is known to all banks.
The ex-ante expected deposit return in such an economy is:
RS =
¸Y + (1 ¡ ¸)X ¡ (I1 + I2 + I3)
I1 + I2 + I3
> 0:
Obviously we have RS < RM .
Anticipating the expected number of early consumers’ withdrawal at date 1, a
bank’s optimal investment decision is to hold N¼1C¤1 in cash and invest N(1¡¼1C¤1 ).
That is, the expected investment of a bank is
N(1 ¡ ¼1C¤1) = I1 + I2 + I3:
Substituting {[N = N¼1C¤1 + N(1 ¡ ¼1)C¤2= (1 + R) in the above condition, we have
N(1 ¡ ¼1)C¤2=
¡
1 + RS
¢
= I1 + I2 + I3:
]}
Therefore, if the number of depositors who withdraw at date 1 is no more than the
expected number ¼1N , the bank will have enough cash to handle the withdrawals;
however, if the number of early withdrawals is more than ¼1N; the bank will have
to borrow from the interbank market through issuing bond to meet the depositors’
demands.
We assume that a borrower has a limited liability. That is, an illiquid borrowing
bank can only repay its borrowing if it has a good project. However, given that the
market knows only ¸; all illiquid banks will be treated in the same way when they
borrow. Therefore, all bonds issued by borrowing banks have the same structure:
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contingent on the realization of the project at date 3, the bond pays,8<: 1; if the project is good,0; otherwise.
To highlight our points, we assume that there is a Bertrand competition among all
lending banks such that these banks break even in lending. Hence, given the lenders’
belief that the probability that a bank will pay back 1 is ¹¸; the equilibrium bond
price is pS = ¹¸.
For an illiquid bank to raise $1, it needs to issue 1¹¸ shares of bonds in the interbank
market. Thus, in order to deal with n excessive early withdrawal consumers for an
amount of nC¤1 , a total of
nC¤1
¹¸ shares of bonds should be issued. While the bond
structure is the same for all illiquid banks, with the private information about the
quality of each bank’s project, the borrowing cost for each bank is di¤erent. For bank
m, with a probability of being able to repay the bond as ¸m, the cost of raising each
dollar is ¸m ¸m¸ ; and the expected cost of raising liquidity to deal with n excessive
early withdrawls is ¸
2
m
¹¸
nC¤1
¹¸ . Therefore, the higher the quality of a bank, or the higher
the ratio ´m ´ ¸m¸ ; the higher the borrowing cost for bank m. Not surprisingly, the
ratio ´m should not be too high and ¹¸ should not be too low to make the expected
pro…t of bank m non negative through borrowing.
Lemma 2 With borrowing in the interbank market,
1. a bank with ¸m · ¹¸ is solvent regardless of number of early withdrawls if (1 ¡
¸m)X + ¸mY ¡ (1 ¡ ¼1)NC¤2 ¸ 0.
2. A good bank with ¸m > ¹¸, is insolvent if the total number of excess withdrawals
nm is large enough such that nm > nm, where
nm ´
¹¸ (Y ¡ X) (´m¡ 1) N(1 ¡ ¼1)¼1
´2m (N ¡ I) (1 ¡ ¼1) ¡ ¼1
¡
¹¸Y + (1 ¡ ¹¸)X¢ :
Proof. A bank’s non-negative expected return condition is
E (R) = (1 ¡ ¸m)X + ¸mY ¡ [(1 ¡ ¼1)N ¡ n]C¤2 ¡
¸2m
¹¸
nC¤1
¹¸
¸ 0:
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If ´m =
¸m
¹¸ · 1, we have n
¡
C¤2 ¡ ´2mC¤1
¢
> 0. Then E (R) > 0 as long as
(1 ¡ ¸m)X + ¸mY ¡ (1 ¡ ¼1)NC¤2 ¸ 0:
Second, if ´m =
¸m
¹¸ > 1 then substituting ´m in (3), E (R) = 0 is equivalent to
X ¡ (1 ¡ ¼1)NC¤2 + ¸m(Y ¡ X) = nm
"µ
¸m
¹¸
¶2
C¤1 ¡ C¤2
#
: (1)
The we have the solution for nm,
nm =
X + ´m¹¸(Y ¡ X) ¡ (1 ¡ ¼1)NC¤2
´2mC
¤
1 ¡ C¤2
: (2)
Recall
N(1 ¡ ¼1C¤1 ) = I1 + I2 + I3;
N(1 ¡ ¼1)C¤2=
¡
1 + RS
¢
= I1 + I2 + I3:
Or,
C¤1 =
1
¼1
µ
1 ¡ I
N
¶
C¤2 =
I
¡
1 + RS
¢
N(1 ¡ ¼1)
=
¹¸Y + (1 ¡ ¹¸)X
N(1 ¡ ¼1) :
where, I = I1+ I2 + I3. Using these conditions in (2), we have
nm =
X + ´m¹¸(Y ¡ X) ¡ (1 ¡ ¼1)NC¤2
´2mC
¤
1 ¡ C¤2
=
X + ´m¹¸(Y ¡ X) ¡
¡
¹¸Y + (1 ¡ ¹¸)X¢
´2m
1
N¼1
(N ¡ I) ¡ ¹¸Y+(1¡¹¸)XN(1¡¼1)
=
(Y ¡ X)¡´m¹¸ ¡ ¹¸¢
´2m
1
N¼1
(N ¡ I) ¡ ¹¸Y+(1¡¹¸)XN(1¡¼1)
=
¹¸ (Y ¡ X) (´m ¡ 1)N(1 ¡ ¼1)¼1
´2m (N ¡ I) (1 ¡ ¼1) ¡ ¼1
¡
¹¸Y + (1 ¡ ¹¸)X¢
It is obvious that E (R) < 0 if nm > ¹nm:
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The intuition behind this lemma is clear. Borrowing from the interbank is equiv-
alent to a subsidy for a bank with ¸m · ¹¸, while the subsidies are provided by
borrowers with ¸m > ¹¸. When the costs of subsidies become too high, a good bank
becomes insolvent when facing too many early withdrawals.
{[it seems to me the following lemma is not directly related to the major results.
if so, we may not include this in the paper]}
Lemma 3 if ´2mC
¤
1 > C
¤
2, @nm=@ ¹¸ > 0, but @nm=@´m can be positive or negative,
depending on whether n < n¤ or n > n¤, where n¤ ´ ¹¸(Y ¡ X)= (2´mC¤1 ).
Proof. ´m =
¸m
¹¸ > 1 then
(1 ¡ ¸m)X + ¸mY ¡ (1 ¡ ¼1)NC¤2 > (1 ¡ ¹¸)X + ¹¸Y ¡ (1 ¡ ¼1)NC¤2 ¸ 0
always hold. An increase in ¸m increases the value of
X + ´m
¹¸(Y ¡ X) ¡ (1 ¡ ¼1)NC¤2
in a linear fashion on the one hand, but it also decrease the value of
n
¡
C¤2 ¡ ´2mC¤1
¢
in a nonlinear fashion on the other hand. In this case there must be an upper bound
for n before E (R) turns negative.
Indeed for ´m =
¸m
¹¸ > 1 such that ´2mC
¤
1 > C
¤
2 , E (R) = 0 is equivalent to
X ¡ (1 ¡ ¼1)NC¤2 + ´m¹¸(Y ¡ X) ¸ nm
¡
´2mC
¤
1 ¡ C¤2
¢
: (3)
The total di¤erentiation of the above condition with respect to ´m leads to
¹¸(Y ¡ X) = @nm
@´m
¡
´2mC
¤
1 ¡ C¤2
¢
+ 2nm´mC
¤
1 :
This, if n is not too large so that ¹¸(Y ¡ X) > 2n´mC¤1 , i.e.,
n < n¤ ´
¹¸(Y ¡ X)
2´mC
¤
1
;
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we have
@nm
@´m
> 0:
Otherwise, if n is so large that n > n¤, we have
@nm
@´m
< 0:
Thus, as long as the number is excess withdrawals is not too large (n < n¤), the
better a bank’s quality, the larger number of excess early withdrawals it can face. If
the number is excess withdrawals is too large (n > n¤), however, the better a bank’s
quality, the smaller number of excess early withdrawals it can face. Notice further
that n¤ itself is a decreasing function in ´m. That is, a better quality bank has a
lower threshold level of n¤.
Substituting ´m =
¸m
¹¸ in (3), E (R) = 0 is equivalent to
X ¡ (1 ¡ ¼1)NC¤2 + ¸m(Y ¡ X) = nm
"µ
¸m
¹¸
¶2
C¤1 ¡ C¤2
#
: (4)
The total di¤erentiation of the above condition with respect to ¹¸ leads to
@nm
@ ¹¸
"µ
¸m
¹¸
¶2
C¤1 ¡ C¤2
#
¡ 2n¸
2
m
¹¸3
C¤1 = 0;
that is
@nm
@ ¹¸
=
2n´2mC
¤
1
(´2mC
¤
1 ¡ C¤2 ) ¹¸
> 0;
for ´m =
¸m
¹¸ > 1 such that ´
2
mC
¤
1 > C
¤
2 , @nm=@ ¹¸ > 0. Hence the better is the average
quality of banks, the bigger is the number of excess withdrawals that a good bank
can face.
It is interesting to notice that the better is the average quality of banks, the bigger
is the number of excess withdrawals that a good bank can face. In other words, if
the average quality of banks is deteriorated, a good bank with the same quality can
only face a smaller number of excess withdrawals than before. This result will be
important when we analyze contagious risks in the interbank market.
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Notice further that the ratio ´m =
¸m
¸
, a measure of heterogeneity of the project
pool in the economy, in turn determines the degree of information asymmetry. Sup-
pose that ¸m 2
£
¸m; ¸ ¹m
¤
, then we can di¤erentiate two extremes: a perfectly homo-
geneous case, where ´m = 1; and an extremely heterogeneous case, where ¸ ¹m ! 1
and the ratio ¸ ¹m
¸
becomes 1
¸
.
Lemma 4 With borrowing in the interbank market, there exist a b¸ 2 (0; 1) and
¸¤ =
N(1¡¼1)+(¼21¡3¼1+1)(I1+I2+I3)
¼1(Y¡X) ¡ XY¡X such that:
1. if ¹¸ ¸ b¸, all borrowing banks are solvent regardless of the degree of project
heterogeneity in the economy;
2. if ¹¸ ¸ ¸¤, then borrowing banks are solvent if the projects in the economy are
perfectly homogeneous.
Proof. Since we are concerned about the providers of subsidies, i.e., banks with
good quality, pulling out of the interbank market, we can focus our attention to
´m 2
³
1; 1
¸
´
.
E (R) = (1 ¡ ¸m)X + ¸mY ¡ [(1 ¡ ¼1)N ¡ n]C¤2 ¡
¸2m
¹¸
nC¤1
¹¸
= (1 ¡ ¸m)X + ¸mY ¡ [(1 ¡ ¼1)N ¡ n]
¹¸Y + (1 ¡ ¹¸)X
N(1 ¡ ¼1) ¡
¸2m
¹¸2
n
¼1
µ
1 ¡ I
N
¶
¸ 0:
or,
1
¹¸E (R) = (1¡´m)X+´mY ¡[(1 ¡ ¼1)N ¡ n]
Y + (1=¹¸ ¡ 1)X
N(1 ¡ ¼1) ¡´
2
m
n
¼1
µ
1 ¡ I
N
¶
¸ 0
First, look at the case that ´m = 1 :
1
¹¸E (R) j´m=1= Y ¡ [(1 ¡ ¼1)N ¡ n]
Y + (1=¹¸ ¡ 1)X
N(1 ¡ ¼1) ¡
n
¼1
µ
1 ¡ I
N
¶
¸ 0
, Y ¡ ((1 ¡ ¼1)N ¡ n) Y+(1=¹¸¡1)XN(1¡¼1) ¡ n¼1
¡
1 ¡ IN
¢ ¸ 0,
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, Y ¡ n¼1
¡
1 ¡ IN
¢ ¸ ((1 ¡ ¼1)N ¡ n) Y +(1=¹¸¡1)XN(1¡¼1)
, N(1¡¼1)
³
Y¡ n¼1 (1¡
I
N )
´
((1¡¼1)N¡n)X ¡
Y
X + 1 ¸ 1=¹¸
, N(1¡¼1)
³
Y¡ n¼1 (1¡
I
N )
´
¡Y ((1¡¼1)N¡n)+((1¡¼1)N¡n)X
((1¡¼1)N¡n)X ¸ 1=¹¸
, ¡N(1¡¼1)
n
¼1
(1¡ IN )+Y n+((1¡¼1)N¡n)X
((1¡¼1)N¡n)X ¸ 1=¹¸
, ¹¸ ¸ ((1¡¼1)N¡n)X
Y n+((1¡¼1)N¡n)X¡N( 1¼1¡1)n(1¡
I
N )
From this we have
¸¤ =
((1 ¡ ¼1)N ¡ 1) X
Y + ((1 ¡ ¼1)N ¡ 1) X ¡ N( 1¼1 ¡ 1)
¡
1 ¡ IN
¢
>
((1 ¡ ¼1)N ¡ n) X
Y n + ((1 ¡ ¼1)N ¡ n) X ¡ N( 1¼1 ¡ 1)n
¡
1 ¡ IN
¢
for any n > 1
Thus when ´m = 1, E (R) ¸ 0 for any ¹¸ ¸ ¸¤:
Then look at the case that ´m =
1
¹¸ :
1
¹¸E (R) j ´m= 1¸ = (1 ¡
1
¹¸ )X +
1
¹¸Y ¡ [(1 ¡ ¼1)N ¡ n]
Y + (1=¹¸ ¡ 1)X
N(1 ¡ ¼1) ¡
1
¹¸2
n
¼1
µ
1 ¡ I
N
¶
¸ 0
Let n = 1, then 1¹¸E (R) = 0
, ¡ 1
¸2
1
¼1
¡
1 ¡ IN
¢
+
³
¡X + Y ¡ ((1 ¡ ¼1) N ¡ 1) X(1¡¼1)N
´
1
¸+X¡((1 ¡ ¼1) N ¡ 1) Y¡X(1¡¼1)N =
0
, ¡ 1
¸2
(1¡¼1)N
¼1
¡
1 ¡ IN
¢
+((Y ¡ X) (1 ¡ ¼1) N ¡ ((1 ¡ ¼1)N ¡ 1) X) 1¸+X (1 ¡ ¼1)N¡
((1 ¡ ¼1) N ¡ 1) (Y ¡ X) = 0
Let (Y ¡ X) (1 ¡ ¼1)N ¡(1 ¡ ¼1) NX = (Y ¡ 2X) (1 ¡ ¼1)N = A < 0, if Y < 2X
((Y ¡ X) (1 ¡ ¼1)N ¡ (1 ¡ ¼1)NX) ¡ X = A ¡ X
X (1 ¡ ¼1) N ¡ (1 ¡ ¼1) N (Y ¡ X) + Y ¡ X = Y ¡ X ¡ A
(1¡¼1)N
¼1
¡
1 ¡ IN
¢
= B.
1
¹¸E (R) j´m= 1¸= ¡
1
¸2
B + (A ¡ X) 1
¸
+ Y ¡ X ¡ A = 0
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Its solutions are :
¸ =
1
2 (Y ¡ X ¡ A)
0@(X ¡ A) +
¡
q
(X ¡ A)2 + 4B (Y ¡ X ¡ A)
1A
where, A = (Y ¡ 2X) (1 ¡ ¼1) N;B = (1¡¼1)N¼1
¡
1 ¡ IN
¢
:
In the following we are going to analyze bank run equilibrium in a SBF economy. To
make our point in a simpler way, we suppose that a bank manager has an incentive
to avoid being identi…ed as a poor manager. We also assume that a bank being
liquidated is perceived by the economy as an indication of bad management; while
a bank run is not perceived so since a well-managed bank may also su¤er from a
bank run. Thus, from the perspective of a bank manager, an expected liquidation at
date 3 is worse than a bank run at date 1. Therefore, when a manager has to choose
between facing an expected liquidation at date 3 and a bank run at date 1, she will
choose the latter.12 Given these assumptions applying the above Lemmas, we have
the following results.
Proposition 2 In a SBF economy
1. if ¹¸ ¸ b¸, then a bank run never happens regardless of degree of project hetero-
geneity in the economy;
2. if ¹¸ ¸ ¸¤, then bank run never happens if banks’ projects are perfectly homoge-
neous;
3. if ´m > 1, for any bank m if nm > nm, this bank will su¤er from a bank run.
The …rst result implies that if the uncertainty of projects …nanced by banks is very
low, or if banks invest in very safe projects, there is no bank run in a SBF economy.
This is because the average quality of the projects are good enough for lenders to
12The same qualitative result can be derived without this assumption but at the costs of a more
complicated analysis.
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lend to all the illiquid banks. That is, under that condition, asymmetric information
in the interbank market is not a serious problem.
The second result says that if the uncertainty of projects is at a moderate level,
then as long as projects are very homogeneous, there is still no bank run in the
economy. This is so because when projects are highly homogeneous, the degree of
asymmetric information is low (in the case of perfect homogeneous, there is no asym-
metric information). Given that the average quality of the projects in the economy
is not too bad, the interbank market functions well.
In contrast, in a MBF economy bad projects are always liquidated. Moreover,
illiquid and insolvent banks may still su¤er bank runs even when the project pool is
relatively safe. That is, a SBF economy may appear better than a MBF economy in
terms of …nancial stability when the project pool of the banks in the economy is less
uncertain. This result sheds some light on the ‘East Asian Miracle’ which happened
before the mid 1990s when the project pool in those economies featured less uncertain
imitations.
The last result shows that when the best illiquid banks (banks with high ¸m
¸
ratio)
face a large amount of excess withdrawals, these banks will be run by their depositors.
This is because to avoid a consequence of liquidation these bank managers choose not
to borrow. The implication of this result is grave to the economy. Because the bank
run may generate negative externalities in the interbank market that it may induce
a bank run contagion which can lead to a collapse of the banking system.
5.4 Bank-Run Contagion and Financial Crisis in a SBF Economy
Our analysis in the above subsection has shown that as long as the number is excess
withdrawals is not too large (nm · nm) for each bank, the banking system is also
subject to contagious risks. However, if there are some large excess early withdrawals
(nm > nm) for some banks, these banks will face bank run. In this subsection, we
show that if a bank run occurs to good quality banks, it can lead to a contagious
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massive bank failures, which can lead to a …nancial crisis.
For simplicity, we assume that the liquidity shock is exogenously given such that
there are w illiquid banks that face the same amount of bn excess early withdrawals.
And the quality of these w banks can be ranked such that each illiquid bank i0s
quality is ¸i = ¸i¡1 + ¹ for all i = 1; 2; :::; w, and ¸0 = ¹. Based on this setup, the
average quality of all illiquid banks is
¸w =
1
w
wX
i=1
¸i =
(1 + w)¹
2
:
We also continue to assume that the average quality ¸w is known by all the banks,
but each individual bank’s ¸i is not known by other banks.
To facilitate our analysis, we group the w banks into two partitions: good (Wg)
and bad (Wb). In Wb, a bank has a subscript i that 1 · i · wb; in Wg, a bank has a
subscript i that wg < i · w, where wg = wb+1. The following shows the relationship
between the ranking of the banks and the partition.
¸1 < ¸2 < ::: < ¸wb| {z } < ¸wg < :::::: < ¸w| {z }
Wb Wg
We further assume that bn · ¹¸2(Y ¡ X)= (2¸1C¤1). Since n¤ = ¹¸2(Y ¡ X)= (2¸iC¤1)
is a decreasing function of ¸i, following Lemma 4, bn > n¤ and @ni=@´i < 0 hold for
all banks in the Wg and Wb partitions. Consequently, the upper portion of or all
banks in the Wg partition decide to pull out from the interbank borrowing, becausebn > ni holds. Following Proposition 4 these banks will su¤er from bank runs.
Moreover, the runs on Wg banks generate externalities in the interbank market
through lowering the average quality of banks that would still stay in the interbank
market. If the Wg banks are run by their depositors, the average quality of the
remaining banks in the economy, ¹¸wb, will decrease to
¹¸
wb =
1
wb
wbX
i=1
¸i =
µ
1 ¡ w ¡ wb
1 + w
¶
¹¸
w < ¹¸w :
Associated with a lower ¹¸wb, the deteriorated quality of the pool of borrowing banks
to a lower ni, according to Lemma 4 (i.e., @ni=@ ¹¸ > 0). As a result, relatively better
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banks in the partition Wb stop from borrowing and face bank run. Let us group these
banks into partition Wb1 . An illustration of partition Wb1 is as follows.
¸1 < ¸2 < ::: < ¸wb2| {z } < ¸wb1 < ::: < ¸wb| {z } < ¸wg < ::: < ¸w| {z }
Wb2 Wb1 Wg
Following Proposition 4, Wb1 banks are run by their depositors. As a result, the
average quality of the remaining illiquid banks will be further lowered. This in turn
will push the borrowing cost further up. The same process repeats that there will be
additional bank runs, further deterioration of qualities of banks, and further lower
bond prices until they reach a low enough level that no bank will issue a bond.
Observing the low bond price later consumers will infer deep troubles in the banking
system and they will all be induced to withdraw at date 1 – a run to the banking
system. At this point, the entire banking system collapses. The above situation is
summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 3 In a SBF economy if ´2iC
¤
1 > C
¤
2 for some of the best banks and the
excess early withdrawals bn · ¹¸2(Y ¡ X)= (2¸iC¤1) ¹¸2 for illiquid banks, there exists
bank run contagions which starts from the best illiquid banks and can lead to a collapse
of the banking system.
The condition of bank run contagions in this result has implications for the timing
of a …nancial crisis in a SBF economy. When an economy is technically less developed
such that most investment projects are featured by imitations, the uncertainty of the
projects is low and the bank run contagion condition is not satis…ed. However, when
a SBF economy is more developed such that a large proportion of investment projects
are in high tech or R&D-intensive, the projects are more uncertain (lower ¹¸) and more
heterogeneous (higher ´m). Then, the bank run contagion condition may be easily
satis…ed.
This result sheds lights to the timing of East Asia Financial Crisis, in particular
why Korea was hit by the crisis, and the Japanese economy stagnation since the
1980s. Since the early 1990s (the 1980s for Japan), Korean economy became more
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developed and it moved onto technological frontiers and invested more in high-tech
projects and in innovations, its project pool became more uncertain, i.e. ¹¸ < ¸¤,
and more heterogeneous, i.e. ´m. So it began to meet the conditions for bank
run contagion and could face a …nancial crisis when some liquidity shocks hit the
economy.13
In sharp contrast, in a MBF economy information about bank investment quality is
revealed to all banks at date 1 because of the liquidation of bad projects. As a result
of the symmetric information, bank runs are always restricted to insolvent banks and
the interbank market never degenerates. Therefore, bank run contagion will never
occur when there are only idiosyncratic shocks!
To make our point in a simple way, our model is quite stylized. The model can
be extended and modi…ed to better capture the reality. For example, it can be
readily modi…ed by introducing imperfect monitoring from depositors in the sense of
Postlewaite and Vives (1987) and Jacklin and Bhattacharya (1988). If depositors’
monitoring is more blurred than that of bank managers’ such that depositors can
divide the banks’ qualities into groups but are not able to further distinguish them
within each group, then lower quality groups of banks are more likely to su¤er liq-
uidity shocks and bank runs. Moreover, the bank run contagion mechanism based
on interbank lending market lemon problem can apply within each group of banks.
From this we can show a bank run contagion extending from bad groups to better
groups.
6. CONCLUDING REMARKS
This paper endogenizes contagious risks and …nancial crises from the perspective
of …nancial institutions and corporate …nance. We began our analysis by examining
informational problems not only between entrepreneurs and banks but also in the in-
13Radelet and Sachs (1998) give detail accounts of “bank run” contagion in the East Asia …nancial
Crisis.
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terbank market. Then we showed how in a SBF economy the information asymmetry
between entrepreneurs and banks leads to a “lemon” problem in the interbank lend-
ing market, which further impedes strong banks from securing loans to solve liquidity
shortage problems when they face liquidity shocks. Thus, bank runs may break out,
which further exacerbate the lemon problem and can lead to a collapse of the entire
banking system. In contrast, under MBF economy entrepreneurs reveal their private
information to banks timely, as a result information about the quality of the banks
is disclosed to the whole banking system timely. This allows the interbank lending
markets to function well in providing loans to illiquid but solvent banks. Thus,
solvent banks will be rescued and …nancial crisis avoided.
Our theory sheds some light to reconcile the seemingly paradoxical phenomena
between the “East Asian Miracle” in the three decades prior to 1997 and the East
Asian …nancial crisis in the period after 1997. In the period of early development, that
is, the catching-up period of the 1960s to the early 1990s, the uncertainty of projects
was low due to the nature of technological imitation. In this situation, our theory
predicts that tin a SBF economy there are no project liquidation and no bank run.
That is, a SBF economy appears even to outperform a MBF economy, and it may
attract many investments. However, if the uncertainty of projects rises precipitously,
for example, when an economy moves on technological frontiers (e.g., South Korea
since the early 1990s), the negative e¤ects of a SBF economy will dominate, …nally
leading to trouble in the …nancial system.
Some …nal remarks about our theory are in order. Although our theory is mo-
tivated by observations of the East Asian …nancial crisis, it is a very basic model
aiming to improve one’s general understanding of …nancial crises. In the real world,
there may not exist a simple MBF economy such that all bad projects are liquidated
as cleanly and early as in our model. That is, even in a well-developed market
economy there exist some SBF …nancial and economic institutions which may cause
bank runs or even …nancial crises, but at a lesser degree than in an economy where
SBF predominate. However, the basic message of our theory is clear.
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Moreover, in order to study …nancial crises from a purely economic perspective,
we provide an institutional foundation of soft-budget constraints where there are
no political problems and every agent maximizes his own economic gain. But our
theory of …nancial crises is general enough that any institutional foundation of a soft-
budget constraint economy (e.g. a foundation based on political considerations, Segal,
1998) applies and can produce the same qualitative results. For example, it is well
documented that there are serious corruptions in some of the Asian economies, and
it is a well held belief that corruptions in those economies, particularly in Philippines
and Thailand, and probably also in Malaysia and even Korea, had a¤ected their
…nancial crises. Our model also allows us to examine how corruption a¤ects …nancial
institutions and changes the likelihood of …nancial crisis.
There are two aspects of corruption that can be introduced into our model. The
…rst aspect is that corruption itself can be a mechanism of soft-budget constraint
(Shleifer and Vishny, 1993). That is, when it is discovered that a project is a bad
one at date 2, …rms and …nancial institutions in a corrupted economy have options
to bribe the government to bailout the project even if the project is not ex post
pro…table. That is, with corruption there will be less e¤ective …nancial discipline in
the economy.
In addition, another aspect of corruption can also be incorporated into our model.
That is corruption can a¤ect selection of projects. This aspect will signi…cantly al-
ter our results on the timing of …nancial crisis. To illustrate this, we suppose that
at date 0 there is an asymmetric information that entrepreneurs know the distrib-
ution better; moreover, some risky projects may bene…t some entrepreneurs. In a
corrupted economy the entrepreneur may bribe the bank to get the project …nanced.
Thus, on average projects selected in a corrupted economy will be riskier than in a
corruption-free economy. Therefore, even in a less developed economy like Philip-
pines and Thailand, many high risk projects can be chosen because of corruption. As
corruptions not only degenerate …nancial disciplines but also make project selection
towards more risky ones, Proposition 3 implies that a corrupted economy is more
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likely to have …nancial crisis.
Our theory has implications for many policy solutions proposed in the literature.
For example, Dewatripont-Tirole (1994) propose the following policies to deal with
bank failures: 1) to liquidate illiquid banks; 2) to allow solvent and liquid banks
to take over illiquid banks; and 3) to provide loans to illiquid banks. Our theory
demonstrates that in a MBF economy, with su¢cient information about the solvency
of illiquid banks, the government should consider the trade-o¤ between closing down
illiquid banks and letting solvent liquid banks take over illiquid banks; or to provide
loans to solvent illiquid banks. However, in a SBF economy, without information
about the solvency of the banks, the government has no other choice but to provide
loans to all illiquid banks or to provide loans to a proportion of them randomly.
With respect to nationalizing illiquid banks, our theory implies that this may work
as an emergency measure if nationalization has an informational value such that with
control rights the government may be able to identify solvent banks. However, this
may not work in the long run because a nationalized bank will likely generate a SBF
environment.
On the lender of last resort (LOLR) policy14, since the government also faces an
adverse selection problem in the sense in that it does not know the solvency of each
bank at date 1, an implication of our theory is that the best that the government can
do may be either to rescue all the banks regardless of their solvency, thus creating a
bail-out trap, or to rescue none of them, thus leaving the banking system vulnerable
to contagious risks and …nancial crisis. Thus focusing on the information asymmetry
between the government and illiquid banks and e¤ectively dealing with them are the
key to the implementation of the LOLR policy.
Another important policy issue concerns the liberalization of …nancial markets
and institutions, whose e¤ects can be analyzed in our model by comparing a one
bank economy (before liberalization) with an M-bank economy (after liberalization).
14See Goodhart and Huang (1998) for a model of LOLR and Huang and Xu (2000) for further
discussions on contagious risks and the LOLR policy.
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According to our theory, a one-bank economy must be a SBF economy. Moreover,
because all the deposits in the economy are pooled in one bank, the risk of facing a
liquidity shock or a bank run will be greatly reduced. Theoretically, if the economy
has a su¢ciently large number of depositors, then the probability of an excessive
early withdrawals from the bank will be negligible. That is, although ine¢cient, this
one-bank economy is almost immune to bank runs or …nancial crisis. In contrast
to a one-bank economy, an M -bank SBF economy is very sensitive to a bank run
contagion due to the lemon problem in the interbank lending market.
This comparison has important implications for banking policies and reforms. The
basic message is that a liberalization of …nancial institutions must be conditional on
measures to harden the budget constraints. If liberalized banks are operating under
SBF and measures to harden the budget constraints are not in place, a liberalization
policy may greatly destabilize the …nancial system!
This simple analysis captures some characteristics of banking systems reform and
liberalization. For instance, a major reform measure in the transition from a central-
ized economy to a market economy is to change the banking system from a one-bank
system (at least conceptually one can regard all state banks as branches of one bank –
the state bank) into a multi-bank system. Many of the banking system liberalization
reforms in East Asia before 1997 shared this spirit as well. According to our theory,
a banking system reform designed to enhance competition as described above can
create huge contagious risks to the system, if additional measures to harden budget
constraints in the system are not implemented simultaneously.
Another important policy implication from our theory for …nancial system reform
and for …nancial-crisis-prevention is that the transparency of the banking system is
critical. However, transparency cannot be achieved by imposing government regu-
lations alone. In fact, with wrong targets in transparency a regulation can cause a
back …re in the sense that the commitment device of banks can be destroyed even
in a MBF economy. That is because the commitment device relies on information
asymmetry between banks. Therefore, an e¤ective reform can only be achieved by
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reforming the …nancial institutions to tighten budget constraints at the micro level.
Finally, our work compliments the existing literature on banking and …nancial
crisis, and this can be seen more clearly through a comparison of our work with some
of the existing literature. Allen and Gale (2000) in the Diamond and Dybvig one-
bank framework show that bank runs are related to the business cycle, rather than
being the results of simple “sunspots.” We are in agreement with their view in that
fundamentals a¤ect …nancial crises, and we argue that …nancial institutions are just
such a fundamental factor, especially in a multi-bank banking system. Chang and
Velasco (1998) extend the Diamond and Dybvig model into an open economy model.
They show that the illiquidity of the domestic …nancial system is at the center of
the …nancial crisis in emerging markets. We regard the Chang and Velasco model
to complement our theory. In fact, we can readily apply their approach to extend
our model and explain how domestic …nancial institutions interact with international
…nancial issues and how an over-borrowing syndrome in the sense of McKinnon and
Pill (1997) is generated.
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